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Experimental vulnerability analysis 
of QKD based on attack ratings
Rupesh Kumar1, Francesco Mazzoncini2, Hao Qin3 & Romain Alléaume2*
Inspired by the methodology used for classical cryptographic hardware, we consider the use of attack 
ratings in the context of QKD security evaluation. To illustrate the relevance of this approach, we 
conduct an experimental vulnerability assessment of CV-QKD against saturation attacks, for two 
different attack strategies. The first strategy relies on inducing detector saturation by performing a 
large coherent displacement. This strategy is experimentally challenging and therefore translates into 
a high attack rating. We also propose and experimentally demonstrate a second attack strategy that 
simply consists in saturating the detector with an external laser. The low rating we obtain indicates 
that this attack constitutes a primary threat for practical CV-QKD systems. These results highlight the 
benefits of combining theoretical security considerations with vulnerability analysis based on attack 
ratings, in order to guide the design and engineering of practical QKD systems towards the highest 
possible security standards.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a beautiful  idea1,2, that allows two legitimate users, the sender Alice and 
the receiver Bob, to establish a secret key with information-theoretic security (ITS) even against a quantum 
attacker, Eve.
QKD systems with increasing performances and reliability have been engineered over the past 25  years3–5. 
This has placed QKD among the quantum technologies with the highest maturity level. It has also paved the 
way for large-scale deployments and for the effective demonstration of QKD in relevant real-world application 
contexts, requiring the ability to provide long-term security for data at flight or at  rest6, such as private clouds 
or critical infrastructures for government, defense or health data  management7. A necessary condition for the 
industrial take-off of QKD will, however, reside not only in the ability to engineer cost-effective QKD systems, 
but also in the capacity to provide solid guarantees regarding their security.
Theoretical security  proofs8–10 constitute a strong conceptual framework to capture the security properties 
of QKD protocols, based on a model. QKD implementations may, however, not fully comply with the model 
used in the security proof, leading to security vulnerabilities and the possibility to launch side-channel  attacks5. 
Optimizing the real-world security of a QKD system hence requires to consider not only the theoretical security 
of the QKD protocol, but also the practical security related to its implementation. As a matter of fact, engineer-
ing constraints may impose stringent limits to the security level that a QKD system can reach. Such constraints 
can indeed lead to significant deviations between the theoretical security level that could be expected with an 
idealized implementation and the security level that can be reached in practice by the real QKD system.
As system design and security evaluation are in practice almost always limited by resources, attacks that are 
easier to implement should be prioritized, as they represent the greatest threats. For instance, some attacks on 
QKD can be realized with a relatively simple procedure and inexpensive hardware, such as detector blinding 
 attack11 that has even been demonstrated on a live QKD  connection12. Some other attacks, on the other hand, 
such as the photon number splitting  attack13 and more generally collective and coherent attacks on  QKD8, have 
played a fundamental role in our understanding of QKD theory. Yet, their implementation requires the ability 
to store and retrieve single photons from a quantum memory, potentially over ms or larger timescales, which 
is currently out of reach, given the limitations of existing quantum memory  technology14. Hence, to guarantee 
a very high security level for QKD, forward-looking methods and standards in quantum cryptography imple-
mentation security shall be adopted, following a methodology similar to the one used to certify the security of 
classical crypto-systems15, called Common Criteria.
The Common Criteria methodology that we introduce is applicable both for discrete-variable DV-QKD and 
continuous-variable (CV)-QKD, and also in principle to any practical quantum cryptographic system, provided 
it has reached a sufficient maturity level (necessary to make testing and vulnerability analysis meaningful). 
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Moreover, we demonstrate in this article the practical relevance of this methodology by conducting vulnerability 
analysis on an experimental CV-QKD system.
In CV-QKD16,17 a few attacks have been proposed to exploit the security  loopholes18–21, however most of them 
have been demonstrated off-line. Demonstrating an active attack on a live CV-QKD system is challenging. It 
requires to overcome several difficulties such as the technical complexity of the attack strategy itself, or of the 
optical phase recovery. In this work, we demonstrate an active attack on a live CV-QKD system running the 
Gaussian modulated coherent state (GMCS)  protocol16. Exploiting the non-linear response of the homodyne 
detector near its detection limit, an eavesdropper, Eve, can launch an attack called Saturation  Attack22,23.
We have considered two practical methods to mount the saturation attack in CV-QKD. The first and most 
challenging one is the coherent attack  strategy22, where Eve resends coherent displaced  signal24 to induce the 
detector saturation. Our second attack strategy consists in the incoherent saturation  attack23, where we shine 
an independent laser towards Bob’s coherent receiver. The implementation of this attack is considerably simpler 
and it constitutes a dangerous threat to practical CV-QKD systems. Inspired by the Common Criteria Common 
Evaluation Methodology v3.1(CEM)25, we introduce a metric called Attack Potential to QKD, and we evaluate 
the two aforementioned saturation attack strategies against this metric.
Although the Attack Potential approach to a practical security evaluation is not new in the world of IT secu-
rity, its introduction in the context of QKD brings fresh perspectives. It has the ability to strengthen the security 
rationale associated with QKD system design and to accelerate the evolution towards a QKD industry capable 
of manufacturing QKD devices with high security assurance.
Results
Attack rating. One crucial part of the complex methodology for this security evaluation is the process of 
identifying, classifying and prioritizing threats associated to vulnerabilities in QKD systems. A comprehensive 
methodology offers general guidance and a metrics to rate the possible attacks against the assets. It also considers 
both the likelihood that a threat agent may successfully perform the attack and the magnitude of the impact that 
this attack has on the assets. In our rating procedure we shall focus on the likelihood of an attack, evaluating the 
total effort required to successfully mount the attack, called the Attack Potential: the higher the Attack Potential, 
the lower the chances of the attack being performed are. To determine the Attack Potential we consider differ-
ent factors (such as the type of equipment required); for each of them we assign a numerical value, the sum of 
them is the actual Attack Potential. In Table 1 we define the semi-qualitative correspondance between rating and 
attack difficulty. Attack paths with an Attack Potential (AP) between 0 and 10 are for example rated as Basic. Such 
attacks can be implemented with little effort and therefore constitute very serious threats. On the other hand, 
attacks with an extremely high Attack Potential, rated here Beyond High, are extremely difficult to implement 
and therefore constitute less pressing threats. (Our rating scale is slightly different from the usual rating scale 
(Table 4 of the  CEM25). The main reason for that is that we had to reshape the boundary values with a factor 4/5, 
since in our attack potential evaluation we do not consider elapsed time as a factor (see Methods). We have also 
simplified the table a little, by merging basic and enhanced-basic).
The saturation attack. Saturation attack on CV-QKD consists in biasing the excess noise estimation by 
actively inducing the saturation of the homodyne detectors. This attack can be  powerful22: it can be combined 
with simple attack strategies by Eve (such as the intercept-resend  attack26) and lead to a full security breach.
In a CV-QKD system that implements the GMCS protocol, Alice prepares coherent states of quadratures 
{XA, PA} , modulates each quadrature according to a Gaussian distribution of variance VA and centered on zero, 
and sends the modulated coherent state to Bob through the quantum channel. Bob randomly measures one of 
the quadratures using a balanced homodyne detector. This results in quadrature measurements XB and PB , with 
variance VB . By correlating sent and measured quadrature values on a fraction of their data, the users estimate 
channel transmittance T and then the excess noise ξ . If these values are within the limit for validating the security 
of the key, they proceed to key distillation on rest of the data, if not the QKD protocol aborts.
The balanced homodyne detector is a crucial part of a CV-QKD system. The linearity range of the homodyne 
detector response is in general characterized offline, as part of the detector calibration process. Assuming it is the 
same for X and P quadrature, we can designate this linearity range as a quadrature interval [α1,α2](α1 < 0 < α2).
Balancing the homodyne detector prior to protocol run ensures that the mean of the homodyne output values 
remain close to zero, and therefore that the homodyne receiver is operated in its linear range, except if signals 
with very large quadrature values are received at Bob side. In case signals with XB << α1 (respectively XB >> α2 ) 
Table 1.  Semi-qualitative scale for attack rating. This scaling is adapted with respect to the Common 
Evaluation  Methodology25, taking into account the fact that we consider 4 out 5 factors in our analysis. For a 
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are received, then the detector will saturate and outputXB = α1 (respectively XB = α2 ). Close or beyond the 
detection limits, response of the detector becomes non-linear to the input signal quadrature, which will effective-
ment reduce the measured variance, compared to the actual quadrature variance of the received optical signals.
In the saturation attack, in order to reach the non-linear regime of the detector response, Eve performs an 
intercept-resend attack and displaces the mean of the Gaussian quadrature modulation of the resent signals from 








 . Without loss of generality, we can set X equal to P such that the effect of 
displacement at Bob is identical for both quadrature measurements. To perform the saturation attack Eve sets 
the amount of displacement  such that quadrature of the coherent state received by Bob overpassed the linear 
range. As a consequence, the saturation affects the measured quadrature variance by Bob. Additionally, Eve may 
not only displace the quadrature value of the coherent state she resends to Bob, she may also apply some ampli-
fication factor G on the resent signal primarily to compensate the 3 dB loss occurring from her heterodyne 
measurement during IR attack.
Now, from the quadrature measurement data obtained from the saturated induced detector, Alice and Bob 
estimate channel parameters Tsat and ξsat both are influenced by displacement  and amplification factor G. For 
a given value of Alice’s quadrature modulation variance VA , Eve can optimize  and G such that excess noise ξsat 
drops below the null key noise threshold and eavesdropping remains undetected. In such case, even though Eve 
has mounted an entanglement-breaking intercept-resend attack (which should lead the QKD protocol to abort 
due to a too high excess noise, generating no key) the attack is not detected, due to saturation, and Alice and Bob 
generate key, that is however insecure: this constitutes a characterized security break.
To characterize the attack, and in particular its impact on key rate, we have defined the following conditions.
• The attacker, Eve, performs the saturation attack: Intercept-resend attack combined with displacement.
• The channel transmission estimation is unaffected ( Tsat = T , where T is the channel transmission in absence 
of attack).
• Alice and Bob obtain a positive key rate from their estimated parameter Tsat and ξsat.
The actual realization of the saturation attack comprises of two steps: intercepting Alice’s signal and resending 
a newly prepared signal to Bob with displacement  and gain G. We can consider that two cooperating eaves-
droppers are involved in the attack: Eveintercept , located near Alice intercepts the signals of quadratures {XA, PA} 
and classically communicates the measurement results {XM , PM} to Everesend - located near to Bob as shown in 
Fig. 1. Due to the technical restrictions imposed by the laboratory equipment, we experimentally demonstrate 
only the resend step of the attack and model the impact of the measurement associated with the intercept step. 
{XM , PM} is deduced from {XA, PA} by simulating a heterodyne measurement, i.e. 3 dB loss factor and also the 
addition of a random Gaussian noise of variance 2 shot  noise26.
Efficient countermeasures against the saturation are known. As detailed  in27 active monitoring of the linearity 
of Bob’s coherent detection can provide a robust countermeasure against saturation attack. This countermeasure, 
however, requires dedicated hardware (additional amplitude modulator at Bob side).  In22 a second countermeas-
ure is proposed, that can be implemented without using additional hardware: it relies on the pre-characterization 
of the detector linearity range, and consists in post-selecting measurement data, based on the fact that these 
quadrature measurements fall, within high confidence, in the linearity range of the detector. This countermeasure, 
that relies purely on software, has a small marginal cost.
Coherent attack strategy. The signal of quadrature {XE , PE} is resent by Everesend , that we will from here 
onwards label as Eve. It is experimentally generated, using a setup built around a Sagnac interferometer, repre-
sented on Fig. 7, and whose functioning is detailed in Methods. The role of this set-up is to generate, knowing 
the in values {XM , PM} , a displaced coherent state of quadrature {XE , PE} that are correspond to the encoding 
of {XM , PM} on a coherent states, to which is applied a coherent gain 
√
G/2 in amplitude, and a controlled 
coherent displacement by a value  = X = P . The Sagnac loop offers a high phase stability which allows 
to precisely control  and therefore minimize the noise. Receiving the displaced coherent state {XE , PE} , Bob 
randomly measures one of the quadratures with a balanced homodyne detector, cf Fig. 6, hence obtaining XB or 
Figure 1.  Scheme for saturation attack. Eveintercept intercepts Alice’s Gaussian modulated signal of quadratures 
{XA, PA} and shares her measurement results {XM , PM} through the classical channel to Everesend . The resent and 
displaced signal of quadrature {XE , PE} is measured by Bob homodyne detector.
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PB . Depending on the value of  , this quadrature measurement will be obtained in the linear or in the saturated 
regime.
Figure 2 shows the effect of the displacement  on Bob’s experimental quadrature measurements. The mean 
value of the homodyne output XB can be shifted towards one of the detection limit α1 = −2.5V  of the detector, 
for a given displacement setting. Selecting displacement angle to 225 degree would direct the shift towards the 
other limit of the linear range α2 = 3.3V  . As can be seen on Fig. 2, when the detector is operated close to it linear 
range limit, then saturation occurs and quadrature variance reduces drastically.
The coherent displacement set-up demands an active feedback routine to compensate the relative phase 
drifts between the displaced signal and the local oscillator. Even though Sagnac loop provides a high stability, 
as illustrated by the level of control obtained on Fig. 2, we could not lower the residual quadrature noise due to 
imperfect phase drift compensation below the null key threshold. For example, considering that 2 π phase drift 
occurring in 1 second, a 500 µ s latency in the feedback loop creates about 0.2 degrees of phase error. This in 
turn results in 0.23
√
N0 fluctuations in homodyne output and generates excess noise of about 5N0 . This implies 
that the excess noise ξsat is above the null key noise threshold value, and prevents the generation of key. In other 
words, in the current setup, Alice and Bob would easily detect attack based on coherent displacement. Reducing 
the feedback latency such that phase drift remains negligible within the feedback intervals, could however bring 
this attacking strategy to meet the attack success conditions.
Incoherent attack strategy. In order to overcome the implementation difficulties of the coherent dis-
placement strategy, we have conceived and tested a much simpler strategy, based on incoherent laser pulse 
 injection23. Saturating the homodyne detector with external laser pulse indeed presents several operational 
advantages over the previous strategy. First, since it is incoherent with the local oscillator, an external laser adds 
only its own shot noise to the excess noise. More importantly, relative phase drift compensation is not required 
for keeping the homodyne in the saturated region. This greatly simplifies Eve’s resent setup as shown in Fig. 3.
In this strategy, saturation is induced by an intense incoherent laser pulse sent along with the resent coher-
ent state. The equivalence of the intensity I of the incoherent laser pulse to the displacement  can be given by 
� =
√
ηb/Ilo(1 − 2Tbs)I , where ηb is the efficiency of Bob, Ilo is the local oscillator intensity and Tbs is the effective 
transmittance applied to the incoherent laser pulse due to asymmetry of beam splitting ratio and the attenuator 
(shown in Fig. 6). In our case Tbs ≈ 49% . To bring uniformity in the description of both experimental strategies, 
since the primary requirement is to induce saturation, we also call “displacement” the effect of this incoherent 
shift of the measured quadratures.
Since optical phase drift compensation is not needed, saturation attack with incoherent laser pulse can achieve 
comparatively much performance in terms of quadrature stability and noise, and can meet success conditions, 
provided the channel loss is not too small (low channel loss make it more difficult for Eve to succeed in the 
intercept-resend attack). The results in terms of excess noise are given in Fig. 4a. The excess noise at Alice has 
been calculated from the variance of saturated homodyne output experimental data, at various transmission 
distance between Alice and Bob. It can be seen that the excess noise is bellow the null key threshold, which 
indicates Eve’s intercept-resend attack remains untraceable. Figure 4b shows the maximal value of final key rate 
per pulse, estimated under collective attacks. Note that the condition Tsat = T cannot be met for distance below 
35 km—see noise model in section Method. A relaxed attack success condition, where Eve does not maintain 
Tsat = T is given in supplementary information.
Figure 2.  Response of homodyne output due to displacement. Input signal sent by Eve, with quadrature 









N0 (green) and saturation at 106.42
√
N0 (magenta). Displacement shifts Bob’s 
quadrature measurement XB (expressed here in volts). Large displacement value can lead to saturation (that 
occurs when XB reaches −2.5Volts).
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Rating of the two attacks. Now that we have defined, and studied the two possible attacks paths to 
exploiting the saturation vulnerability of the homodyne receiver, we are ready to use Table 3 to evaluate their 
Attack Potential. We assume that the hacker Eve tries to obtain as much information as possible about the Target 
of Evaluation (TOE) design, i.e. we need to assume that Eve has a good knowledge about the specifications of 
the main components of the QKD system. Part of this information can indeed be found easily online. However, 
some important details might be system-specific or protected by a non-disclosure agreement between the ven-
dor and the owner of the QKD system. For this reason, for both attacks, the Knowledge factor for the TOE factor 
is evaluated as restricted.
Both attacks rely on the intercept-resend strategy and can in principle be launched in real time. However, 
such online implementations of the attacks require to evaluate the optimal value of the displacement  and of the 
gain G (see methods): this can be obtained by manually tuning Eve’s setup and measure the excess noise due to 
displacement, as in Fig. 8. Assuming a frequent trusted evaluation of the channel loss, this tuning might be quite 
challenging, especially in the case of the coherent attack, where the tuning precision is inevitably limited by the 
accuracy of the phase locking. As a result, for the coherent attack the Windows of Opportunity can be chosen as 
difficult, while moderate for the incoherent attack. The main differences between the two attack paths are related 
to the requirements in terms of equipment and expertise. As previously explained, the coherent attack requires 
Eve to resend coherent displaced signal while being successfully phase locked with Alice and Bob. To achieve 
this, Eve needs to be an expert in coherent optical communications, able to control noise at the quantum level 
and to have access to bespoke equipment. On the other hand, the incoherent attack only requires Eve to send an 
incoherent signal, without worrying about being phase locked with Alice and Bob: this is reflected in a simplified 
setup (Equimpent specialized) and in a lower level of required technical expertise for Eve (Expertise proficient). 
From Table 3 we hence obtain an Attack Potential of 26 and 14 for coherent and incoherent attack respectively. 
As expected, the coherent attack is rated as beyond high, while the incoherent attack is only rated as moderate.
Figure 3.  Setup for incoherent coherent attack strategy, relying on pulse injection from an external incoherent 
laser to induce saturation. AM: Amplitude Modulator, PM: phase Modulator, BS: BeamSplitter, PBS: 
Polarization BeamSplitter, Att: Variable Attenuator.
Figure 4.  Results:- attack with incoherent light. (a) excess noise at Alice. Red squares indicate the null key noise 
threshold and blue squares the estimated values of ξsat . (b) key rate. Black squares are simulated values of final 
key per pulse while Green squares are from the experiment. Error bars are one standard deviation of fluctuations 
among ten smaller data block of size 107 . Success condition of Tsat = T can not be fulfilled below 35 km.
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Discussion
Our experimental vulnerability analysis work, reported in the Results section, focuses on CV-QKD system. The 
attack rating methodology can apply equivalently to DV-QKD systems. Let us consider for example the 2011 
DV-blinding  attack28, i.e. the first full-field attack against a commercial DV-QKD system. This DV blinding attack 
exploits a vulnerability of the single photon detectors: by injecting bright continuous-wave light and perform-
ing a full faked-state attack, an attacker Eve can take full control of Bob’s detection outcomes. The similarities 
between the DV-blinding attack and our CV-incoherent attack strategy are reflected in the evaluation of their 
attack ratings. In the DV-blinding attack, Eve is required to know the specifications of the main components of 
the system, in particular Bob’s detection part, and to tune her setup accordingly to Bob’s. She moreover needs 
to align her polarization reference frame to match Bob’s one. In both attack strategies, we can assign a restricted 
level for the Knowledge of the TOE and a moderate level for the Window of Opportunity. To successfully per-
form the DV-blinding attack, Eve needs to emulate Bob in the detection of the quantum state, using a duplicate 
of Bob’s setup, and to deploy a faked-state generator (FSG) to force him to have her same detection values. The 
sophistication of the equipment and the expertise required is comparable to the CV-incoherent attack strategy: 
specialized equipment and proficient expertise. Summing all terms, the blinding attack rating would be moder-
ate, with an Attack Potential of 14.
Quantifying the level of security assurance of a QKD device is a complex undertaking that should be based 
on a sound and largely recognized methodology. This objective translates into the requirement of standards for 
QKD security evaluation and certification. Such standards have recently started to be actively developed within 
international standardization  groups29,30 and are now subject to an intense international effort.
The practical ability to evaluate QKD security will also require to set up evaluation lab facilities and to train 
“QKD security evaluation engineers”, able to conduct penetration testing on QKD systems, both in terms of 
software and hardware. In that perspective, the experience accumulated in the context of classical secure hard-
ware, and in particular the use of the Common Criteria methodology by the smartcard  industry31, is invaluable.
The main message of this article is to point at the relevance of calculating Attack Potential to rate attacks 
against QKD device, following a methodology already in place to evaluate the security of classical cryptographic 
hardware. Moreover, Attack Potential can be used as a metric in order to balance the effort invested at QKD 
system design stage and at countermeasure development stage to thwart attacks, allowing to prioritize the attacks 
that constitute the most serious threats in practice.
One might however wonder whether this message should be read negatively, from a QKD viewpoint. Does it 
imply that the security QKD can provide essentially compares to the security that can be reached with classical 
hardware crypto-systems?
We want to argue that this not the case, for fundamental reasons: quantum crypto-systems strongly differ from 
their classical counterparts and provide a security advantage that is not only related to the information-theoretic 
security versus computational security paradigm. Quantum cryptography is moreover intrinsically based on 
models where the inner details of the physical layer are tied to information-theoretic measurable quantities. For 
instance, a functional QKD system is by definition sensitive to losses or errors occurring at single photon level. 
This is in strong contrast with classical systems, where information is typically encoded over a very large num-
ber of particles, such as classical optical pulses containing many photons. As a consequence, a classical system 
is oblivious to leakage occurring at the level of single quanta and cannot match the security level that can be 
provided, at least in principle, by a quantum crypto-system.
Considering the interplay between QKD implementation complexity and security also leads to an important 
reassessment. Theoretical security and practical security of a given QKD system may indeed significantly differ, 
notably when practical security is limited by engineering constraints. This calls to reconsider the absolute security 
claims sometimes associated with QKD and to adopt a more balanced viewpoint taking implementation com-
plexity into consideration. We have depicted on Fig. 5 an case illustrating this situation: we consider two QKD 
protocols, (The term “protocol” has to be understood here in a holistic sense, ranging from the specifications 
of the physical implementation of the QKD devices, to the detail of the logical operations that they perform in 
order to establish a key.) P1 and P2, where protocol P1 has a more advanced security proof than protocol P2, 
therefore allowing to claim a higher security level in theory. However, it is possible that the protocol P2 has a 
lower implementation complexity than P1 and that, for the practically reachable implementation complexity 
corresponding to the engineering threshold, the practical security, i.e. the security that can be reached in practice 
by the QKD system, is larger with P2 than with P1.
Finally, the use of Attack Potential in QKD has also implications regarding the security that can be targeted. 
In particular, optimizing the security level of a given QKD device requires to first thwart attacks with the lowest 
Attack Potential before focusing on more complex ones. We have moreover explicitly demonstrated, on a live 
CV-QKD system, how different attacks related to the same theoretical vulnerability - i.e. the non-linear response 
of the homodyne receiver - can lead to different Attack Potentials. For a first attack path, detector saturation is 
reached using a coherent displacement. However, the practicality of this attack is limited due to noise generated 
from the imperfect phase drift compensation. The second attack path is on the other hand much more dangerous 
in practice: shining a simple external incoherent laser, it allows to drive the homodyne detector in the non-linear 
region of its characteristics and to precisely control the excess noise generated from Eve’s intercept-resend attack, 
while meeting the conditions defined for the success of the attack.
Adapting existing criteria from IT security to the context of quantum cryptography is certainly a long and 
challenging path, but it is essential if we aim to make quantum devices relevant in the context of cyber security. 
We have summarized in Table 2 the results of our security evaluation procedure of two attack paths on CV-QKD, 
in terms of Attack Potential, illustrating that this methodology can constitute a useful step towards establishing 
forward-looking standards for the vulnerability assessment of QKD devices.
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Methods
Common criteria and attack rating. Common Criteria (CC) is the set of internationally recognized 
technical standards and configurations for security evaluations of Information Technology (IT) products and 
technology. The terminology and the concepts deployed in the CC aim to be as general as possible. Indeed, they 
are not intended to restrict the class of IT security problems of which CC is applicable, making them well suited 
to be extended for quantum communication devices, such as a QKD system. In simple terms, this comprehen-
sive methodology aims at supporting the needs of three groups with a general interest in evaluation of the secu-
rity properties of a certain Target of Evaluation (TOE): owners, developers and evaluators. In particular, what the 
owner of the TOE of the device wants is to protect his assets (any possible entity that he places value upon) from 
possible threat agents, i.e. someone or something that can abuse these assets against the interests of the owner.
In this context, we seek to offer a standardized framework for evaluating the risks associated to different 
threats and the effectiveness of the implemented countermeasures for quantum communication devices. The 
rating procedure consists in attributing a numeric value to the Attack Potential. In the Common Criteria frame-
work, rating is performed by considering the following factors: 
(a) Expertise
(b) Knowledge of the TOE
(c) Window of opportunity
(d) Equipment
(e) Elapsed time
Expertise refers to the level of technical expertise required to successfully perform the attack. Clearly an 
attack that can be mounted by a person with a regular level of education without an advanced knowledge in any 
specific field should be prioritized. The Knowledge of the TOE involves, instead, the amount of knowledge of the 
Table 2.  Summary of the analysis on the two attacks to the homodyne detection. We have reported the values 
for each factor of the Attack Potential, namely: Exp. stands for Expertise, KoT for Knowledge of the TOE, WoO 
for Window of Opportunity and Equ for Equipment. The factors chosen for the analysis are from Common 
 Criteria25.
 Attack potential Rating Experimental results
Coherent attack
Exp  KoT  WoO  Equ AP
Beyond high
 Noise model experimentallly characterized
6 3 10 7 26 × Attack not feasible under noise model
Incoherent attack
Exp  KoT  WoO  Equ AP
Moderate
 Attack experimentally demonstrated
3 3 4 4 14
Figure 5.  Pictorial representation of the possible divergence between theoretical (th.) and practical 
(pract.) QKD security. A QKD protocol P1 may have a stronger theoretical security (reachable for a perfect 
implementation) than another QKD protocol P2. Yet, in practice, QKD protocols can only be operated below a 
certain implementation complexity level materialized by the engineering threshold, and protocol P2 provides a 
stronger practical security than protocol P1.
8
Vol:.(1234567890)
Scientific Reports |         (2021) 11:9564  | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-87574-4
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
TOE design and operation required: retrieving detailed specifications about the device, for example, might be 
challenging for an attacker, leading to an higher Attack Potential. Regardless of the information acquired about 
the TOE, it is possible that, to successfully mount the attack, a previous tuning of the hacker’s setup is needed. 
This aspect is considered in the Window of Opportunity, together with possible difficulties on getting access to 
the TOE. One last remarkable factor is the level of sophistication of the equipment used in the attack: an attack 
using equipment easy to obtain and simple to operate is obviously more dangerous than another attack that would 
require more advanced equipment. Quantum cryptography (QC) even often consider that the attacker Eve might 
have access to technology not available today such as large quantum computers or long-term quantum memo-
ries, and it is clear strength of QC to enable to prove security even in this context. From attack rating viewpoint, 
such “Quantum equipment” would be considered to have infinite rating, and is such not included in Table 3). To 
coherently consider these different factors and evaluate their contribution to the final Attack Potential we assign 
at each factor one numerical value, following Table 3.
In order to guarantee a consistent evaluation with respect to attacks to other TOEs, the different levels for 
each factor and their numerical values come from the Common Evaluation Methodology version 3.125 section 
B.4, where there is a full description of each possible level. Indeed, their description is particularly generic, to 
guarantee a meaningful characterization of an attack to a wide range of possible TOEs (such as a QKD device).
In the Common Criteria an additional factor is considered to rate the attacks: the elapsed time, i.e. the time 
taken to identify a certain vulnerability and to successfully mount the attack. To fix a correct timescale, this 
quantity needs to be compared with the usual time needed for a countermeasure to be applied. The vulnerability 
analysis that we report about in this article, has been performed on a laboratory QKD system. In this context, 
the main drivers of the elapsed time such as the product revision lifecycle, or the time during which an attacker 
could access the QKD system, cannot be meaningfully defined. For these reasons, we did not consider the elapsed 
time factor factor in our evaluation. We should however state that this factor will become well defined when 
considering the security of QKD products deployed on real-world networks and should hence be taken into 
account in future security evaluations of QKD, in conformity with Common Criteria.
In a complete vulnerability analysis, attack rating is sometimes split in two steps, for example in the case of 
 smartcards31. The identification step is related to the effort required to create and apply the attack to the TOE for 
the first time. The exploitation step is then related to the effort required to apply the attack to the TOE knowing 
the techniques developed in the identification step. Both steps lead to a rating, based on the different factors. 
For the sake of simplicity, we have not distinguished these two steps in the present article, but we have just fol-
lowed the general ground rules provided by Common Criteria. This can moreover be justified by the fact that 
the operational context associated to the exploitation step is essentially missing in the context of laboratory QKD 
prototype. We hence have rated attacks in a single step, based on the four factors out of five mentioned above 
(Expertise, Knowledge of the TOE, Window of opportunity and Equipment). This has lead us to adapt the rat-
ing methodology and the severity scale presented in Tables 1 and 3 with respect to the original tables from the 
Common Evaluation  Methodology25.
Table 3.  Table for the evaluation of the Attack Potential used in the article. Elapsed time factor has not been 
considered: see text for explanations. For a complete guide on how evaluate those factors refer to the Common 























Scientific Reports |         (2021) 11:9564  | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-87574-4
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
Saturation of balanced homodyne detector. In a balanced homodyne detection, signal is mixed with 
intense local oscillator on a 50/50 beam splitter. Quadrature information is retrieved by subtracting the photo-
curents generated from two photodiodes of identical detection efficiency, connected at the output ports of the 
beamsplitter. Due to imperfect splitting ratio of beam splitter, as well as efficiency mismatch of photodiodes, it is 
necessary to add appropriate attenuation at the respective output port of the beam splitter, see Fig. 6.
This equalizes the photocurrents and hence sets the mean of the output voltage of the homodyne detection 
close to zero. This is referred as balancing the homodyne or more precisely “balancing the homodyne with 
respect to the local oscillator port”. It has been shown that such balancing is essential to reduce the excess noise 
due to local oscillator intensity  fluctuation32. In case of imperfect balancing one of the photodiodes generates 
more current than the other. As a result, the value of the homodyne output shifts towards the detection limit 
and this may lead to saturation.
The reason for saturation is due to the limited amplification factor of homodyne electronic circuitry. In our 
case circuit is made around Amptek A250 charge amplifier, powered by ± 5V power supply, that exhibits detec-
tion limit α1 at -2.5V in the negative DC level and α2 at +3.3V in the positive DC level (which is observed while 
interchanging photodiodes). Saturation behavior is also observed while setting low dynamic range of data acquisi-
tion card (say, ± 2V) that is used to acquire homodyne output for post processing. In this work, we have set the 
data acquisition card range at ± 5V, thus the linear range is limited solely by the homodyne electronic circuitry.
Parameter estimation. In CV-QKD system that uses GMCS  protocol16, the quantum channel is charac-
terized by its transmission T and its excess noise ξ . These parameters are estimated from Alice and Bob modu-
lated and measured quadratures. Under saturation attack, these parameters are modified into Tsat and ξsat.
During the intercept-resend (IR) attack, the quadrature measured by Eve is: XM = XA + X0 + X
′
0
 , where X0 
is the vacuum noise quadrature due to Alice preparation and X
′
0
 is due to 3dB loss from Eve’s heterodyne meas-







+ X + X
′′
0 . Here, G is the amplification 




 is due to coherent state preparation by Eve. The term X determines the amount of shift in the mean 
value of quadrature. The same formalism holds true also for P quadrature. The parameter estimation takes the 
 form22:
where XBsat and VBsat denote quadrature and its variance measured under saturation attack. One aspect of the 
attack worth mentioning here is that we assume that Eve does not tamper with the shot noise calibration phase.
Setup for coherent displacement. The experimental setup shown in Fig. 7 implements the resend ses-
sion of the saturation attack. We have implemented CV-QKD Everesend  system
33 using a Sagnac loop realized 
with variable beamsplitter (VBS).This allows to generate displaced GMCS signals as explained in Results. We 
have used a 1530.12nm pulsed laser of width 50ns, at a repetition rate of 1MHz, for generating this displaced 
signal. Displacing the signal is achieved as follows. The VBS, with splitting ratio ≈99.9% , splits the pulse from the 
circulator into two. Less intense signal pulse in clockwise direction goes under Gaussian modulation by ampli-
tude modulator (AM1) and phase modulator (PM1) and further heavily attenuated by isolator (connected in 
reverse to achieve an attenuation higher than 30dB). High intense pulse travels along anti-clockwise directions, 
referred as pump pulse, meets the signal pulse at VBS and displaces  it24. The amplitude modulator AM2 controls 
the intensity of the pump and thence the amount of displacement  . A PIN diode attached to the VBS helps 
to monitor the stability of displacement operation. The Sagnac configuration helps to lock the relative phase of 
pump pulse and signal pulse to zero. Finally, the circulator directs the displaced signal towards the polarization 
beam splitter (PBS) that polarization multiplexes the local oscillator and displaced signal to the output fibre 
channel.
Setup for incoherent laser pulse injection. In this version of attack, Eve sends external laser pulse of 
20ns width, along with signal pulse in the same polarization but at different wavelength (1550.12 nm). The sig-
nal laser and incoherent laser pulses are synchronized with proper delay. At Bob station, he performs the same 
(1)














VA − N0 − vele
)
Figure 6.  Balanced homodyne detection. An attenuator (Att) in one of the output port of 50/50 beamsplitter 
(BS) balances the photo current generated from photodiodes PIN1 and PIN2. Homodyne electronics circuit 
amplifies the subtracted photo currents.
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homodyne measurement as in the coherent attack strategy, where incoherent laser pulse is polarisation demul-
tiplexed along with signal. It exploits two features of the homodyne setup: imbalance of the homodyne experi-
enced by the light through signal port and also wavelength dependent splitting ratio of the beam  splitter19,21,34. 
By taking into account the wavelength dependent effect and the attenuator value adjusted for the local oscillator, 
the effective transmittance applied to the incoherent laser is approximately Tbs ≈ 49% , while the transmittance 
applied to local oscillator is about Tlo ≈ 50% ± 0.05% . Varying intensity of the incoherent light shifts the mean 
of the homodyne output towards the saturation limit α1 and as a result affects the output variance.
Optimizing displacement  and gain G. In order to evaluate optimal values of  and G for successful 
attack, it is essential to characterize the noises associated with displacement as well as incoherent laser pulse. In 
the absence of resent signal, displacement pump/incoherent light is sent to Bob and amount of noise recorded 
for various values of  . This helps to model the excess noise at Bob, shown in Fig. 8a, b, and it is taken into 
account during optimization of  and G. The Fig. 8c, d show excess noise at Alice with respect to  . Value of 
detection limit α1 is calibrated as 106
√
N0 ( −2.5V  expressed in shot noise unit) for the optimization. For each 
transmission distance and for respective optimal VA ,  and G are calculated such that excess noise falls below the 
null key threshold. The optimal values are those that correspond to a maximum key rate, with Tsat = T , shown 
Figure 7.  Experimental setup for generating displaced coherent state. AM: Amplitude Modulator, PM: Phase 
Modulator, BS: BeamSplitter. In the Sagnac loop, Gaussian modulated signals are prepared using the AM and 
PM modulators and are then displaced at the Variable Beam Splitter (VBS), based on a coherent interference 
between pump. Displaced signals is then sent to Bob along with local oscillator.
Figure 8.  Excess noise due to displacement (a)–(d). Red circles and blue squares represents noise from 
coherent displacement and incoherent light, respectively. Black lines are theoretical fit with respective noise 
model. (a) and (b) show excess noise at Bob induced by  . Noise from coherent displacement shows quadratic 
behaviour while incoherent light adds noise from its own shot noise which is linear. Noise at Alice is shown in 
(c) and (d). (e)–(f) Optimal values of  and G at a different distances are calculated based on noise model from 
(a) and (b). Red and blue dots represent coherent and incoherent attack, respectively.
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in Fig. 8e, f. It can be seen that at a transmission distance shorter than 50 km and 35 km, respectively for coherent 
and incoherent attack strategy, no values of G and  are able to meet attack success conditions. The difference 
in feasible distances could have an impact on the attack potential as it affects the window of opportunity (WoO) 
rating factor (it is easier to meet attack conditions at shorter distance than longer distances). In the present case, 
the minimal distance to launch the attack is respectively 50 km for incoherent attack and 35 km for coherent 
attack. This difference is in line with the fact that have attributed a larger WoO rating to the coherent attack. In 
the incoherent attack strategy, the average power of the incoherent light required to reach the detection limit 
α2 = 106
√
N0 is observed as 5.55  uW
35.
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